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Classically, prediction markets depend entirely on the
willingness of market participants to enter into trades with one
another. Web sites like Tradesports and the Iowa Electronic
Markets operate on the principle of a “continuous double
auction.” Traders enter the prices at which they are willing to
purchase or sell shares. Orders are matched where possible, or
else put on “bid” and “ask” queues. The market prediction can
be obtained by considering either the most recent price or the
midpoint of the bid-ask spread. A limitation of this approach is
that in some markets, bid-ask spreads can be very large. This
may be because potential traders are worried that trading
partners may have inside information, or simply because there is
limited interest in trading. In any event, in these circumstances,
classically structured prediction markets do not produce
accurate point estimates of probabilities.
Because of this liquidity problem, there has been
substantial interest in developing alternative market structures.
Maxwell and Burns (1996) explains how to create a virtual
specialist that adjusts market prices by identifying imbalances in
pending buy and sell orders, while Abramowicz (1999) would
require the most recent trader in effect to become a specialist at
a price determined by the seller. In the past few years, two
alternative classes of mechanisms have been developed with the
virtue that mathematical formulas can calculate the price
entirely on the basis of past transactions. First, Hanson (2003)
has described a “market scoring rule,” and Hanson (2006)
particularly emphasizes the virtues of one version of this
approach, the logarithmic market scoring rule. The logarithmic
approach has now been widely adopted, for example by
Microsoft for its internal markets and by Inkling Markets, a
provider of prediction market software on the web. Second,
Pennock (2004) describes a variation on pari-mutuel betting,
called the dynamic pari-mutuel market. Yahoo!, Pennock’s
employer, uses this approach in its Tech Buzz market.

In this article, I will argue that while both the
logarithmic scoring rule and the dynamic pari-mutuel market
have uses in particular contexts, a different form of the market
scoring rule, the quadratic market scoring rule, is better suited to
serve as a foundation for many prediction market applications.
The central point is that with the quadratic market scoring rule,
the profit that a user can make by improving a prediction is
constant across the probability spectrum (or, for
nonprobabilistic estimates, the prediction spectrum), and so the
subsidy is constant as well. The quadratic market scoring rule is
thus equivalent to what I call a “uniform liquidity automated
market maker.” Given the relatively small subsidies for
prediction markets to date, what predictive improvements a
subsidy rewards may not be so important, but the issue should
have greater importance in potential future markets with greater
subsidies, such as markets designed to provide information to
corporations or governments.
Even if uniform liquidity is not desirable, the
approach can be easily modified to allow for subsidy
variability—either for different portions of the probability or
prediction spectrum, or across time—in any way specified by
the market administrator. Creators of subsidized markets should
be considering directly how to distribute market subsidies,
rather than relying implicitly on the default approach of the
logarithmic market scoring rule (though at times, a logarithmic
distribution may be exactly what is appropriate for the decision
task) or the dynamic pari-mutuel market. In addition, the
approach that I describe lends itself to a simple user interface
that even those who do not understand markets should be able
easily to understand, and the quadratic market scoring rule can
be easily adapted to make nonprobabilistic predictions.

I. ROBIN HANSON’S MARKET SCORING
RULE
Hanson’s market scoring rules are built on a statistics
literature on “scoring rules,” of which DeGroot and Fienberg
(1983) provide a useful overview. A scoring rule is simply a
formula used to provide an incentive for a predictor to make an
accurate prediction, where more accurate predictions generally
earn greater amounts of money. “Strictly proper” scoring rules
are scoring rules that should induce risk-neutral actors to make

honest probabilistic assessments, by providing them maximum
expected payoffs from announcing accurate probabilistic beliefs.
The market scoring rule adapts scoring rules to a
context in which individuals make successive predictions. It
reflects two clever insights. The first insight is that instead of
paying each of the predictors according to the scoring rule, the
market sponsor can pay each predictor according to the amount
by which the predictor improves on the prediction. That is, each
predictor receives the payoff according to the scoring rule
applied to the predictor’s own prediction, reduced by the payoff
according to the scoring rule applied to the previous prediction.
In effect, any new predictor can come along and make a new
prediction, receiving a payout in the form of a scoring rule, as
long as this predictor is willing to pay off the previous predictor
according to the same scoring rule.
So far, this may not seem to have anything to do with
prediction markets as classically defined. Hanson’s second
clever insight, however, was that for each market scoring rule,
an automated market maker can be constructed that in effect
implements the scoring rule. Based on the number of shares for
each contingency being forecast, a formula can be used to
calculate a price, which can be understood as a forecast if the
scoring rule is strictly proper. The automated market maker will
sell an infinitesimal share at this price. Each infinitesimal
purchase raises the price, but with calculus, it is possible to
derive formulas indicating for any given amount of money, how
many shares can be purchased, and what the new price of the
share will be afterward.
The underlying dynamics are precisely the same as
with the market scoring rule in the absence of a market. When
all is said and done, a trader’s profit in a market using this
automated market maker will be exactly the same as if the trader
received payment under the market scoring rule based on the
new price and in turn paid off the prior trader based on the old
price. The correspondence, however, may not be intuitively
obvious to traders. The amount that a user has to pay up front is
not the prior trader’s payoff under the market scoring rule – that
amount will not be determined until the market closes. Instead,
it is a price equal to the amount that the user will lose if the
event corresponding to the shares purchased does not occur. The
amount that the user eventually receives if the event occurs is
not the payoff under the scoring rule, but, as in classically
structured prediction markets, some fixed amount (such as $1
per share).
These insights alone would have provided for a major
improvement in prediction market technology from Hanson, the
inventor of the classical prediction markets trading structure.
But Hanson had another critical insight, that the market scoring
rule could be used as the basis for a “combinatorial” market. In
a combinatorial market, participants can trade not only on
whether any particular event will occur, but also on whether a
particular event will occur contingent on another event. The
number of possible contingencies that individuals might like to
trade on increases exponentially in the number of events, and
past some point may become computationally unmanageable
with current computers, but Hanson showed at least how an
automated market maker could manage trading on all possible
combinations for a relatively small number of events.

Ideally, in a combinatorial market, trading on the
probability of A given B shouldn’t result in a change in the
probability of B, or a change in the probability of C given A.
Hanson proved that this independence could be achieved with
only one form of the market scoring rule, the logarithmic market
scoring rule. Given this observation, it is not surprising that the
logarithmic market scoring rule has been so widely adopted.
Hanson provided a formula for the price function for the
logarithmic market scoring rule, and Pennock (2006) has
published the cost function as well. Meanwhile, Pennock
concluded that the market scoring rule corresponding to the
quadratic scoring rule “is not very interesting or useful in
practice.”
Apparently, Pennock came to this conclusion because
he calculated a cost function for the quadratic market scoring
rule based on a single market that could handle any number of
contingencies.1 Such an approach works well with the
logarithmic market scoring rule. With this approach applied to
the quadratic market scoring rule, however, as soon as one
security reaches its upper limit, the market maker cannot allow
purchases of other securities to drive down the other prices,
because otherwise the probabilities corresponding to the various
securities would add up to more than 1. As we will see,
however, there is a simple solution to this problem. Where there
are two possible events, the automated market maker can sell
two different types of contracts implementing opposite quadratic
market scoring rules to derive a single market price. For more
than two events, additional markets can be deployed, with
minimal additional computational complexity, and a subsidy
intended for the predictive task can be divided among them.
But it may seem that there is relatively little reason to
use a quadratic market scoring rule when the logarithmic market
scoring rule already exists. In fact, however, the logarithmic
scoring rule has a serious disadvantage for many applications.
The amount of subsidy that a user receives for making a
correction to a probability assessment varies dramatically across
the probability spectrum, particularly near the ends of the
spectrum. It can be shown, for example, that the amount of
money that a user can expect from correcting a prediction from
0.10 to 0.11 (assuming that 0.11 is in fact correct) is only 13.8%
as much as from correcting 0.01 to 0.02 (assuming that 0.02 is
in fact correct).2 Equivalently, with the automated market
maker, a user will purchase far more shares in moving the price
from 0.01 to 0.02 than in moving the price from 0.10 to 0.11.
Because the logarithmic scoring rule provides infinite liquidity
near the ends of the probability spectrum (although not infinite
profit potential), trading can never move a probability all the
way to 0 or 1, even if the event being predicted has already
occurred (but the market administrator has not terminated the
market).
There may be situations in which it makes sense to
have very high subsidies for trading near zero. Suppose, for
1

This is explained in an unpublished paper by Pennock, Yiling
Chen, and Mike Dooley.

2

This 13.8% figure can be calculated as follows:
((.11*ln(.11)+(1-.11)*ln(1-.11)) – (.11*ln(.10)+(1-.11)*ln(1.10))) / ((.02*ln(.02)+(1-.02)*ln(1-.02)) – (.02*ln(.01)+(1.02)*ln(1-.01))).

example, that one were using a prediction market to assess the
chance of a relatively low probability catastrophic, event. It
might make a big difference for policy response whether the
event has 0.001 or 0.002 probability, and it might be sensible to
provide as great a subsidy for correcting a prediction from one
level to the other as from, say, 0.01 to 0.02.
But there are many prediction markets for which this
is not the case – it doesn’t much matter just how outrageously
low the Boston Celtics’ chance of winning the NBA
Championship are right now. Yet, using the logarithmic scoring
rule to predict the NBA Champion would provide risk-neutral
participants a relatively large incentive to work out those small
numbers. The point is most obvious for prediction markets that
are merely forecasting point estimates. (It is possible to use the
logarithmic scoring rule to motivate forecasters to estimate an
entire probability distribution, but for some applications, all the
market sponsor really cares about is the mean of that
distribution, and requiring each forecaster to enter an entire
probability distribution is overkill.) Perhaps we would like to
use a prediction market to forecast simply how many games the
Celtics will win this year. In that case, we would likely want the
same subsidy for each per game marginal improvement in the
forecast.
Even where it may make sense to devote a relatively
large portion of a market subsidy to the bottom of the
probability spectrum, it might be desirable to allow the market
administrator to specify just how the subsidy should be for each
part of the probability spectrum. Suppose, for example, that
Corporation A creates a prediction market to determine whether
Corporation B will release a product competing with an offering
from Corporation A. It may be that it will be worth it for
Corporation A to respond (e.g., by accelerating its own project)
if the probability is greater than 0.10, but that Corporation A
will not respond at all for lower probabilities and will not
augment its response for much higher probabilities. In that case,
it makes sense to have the most liquidity in the direct vicinity of
the 0.10 probability, not on the ends of the probability spectrum.

II. A UNIFORM LIQUIDITY AUTOMATED
MARKET MAKER
This section describes a different automated market
maker, one that provides uniform liquidity across the probability
spectrum. Section II.A derives formulas for this market maker
by conceptualizing this market maker as one that sells two kinds
of shares, “high” and “low,” and places an “ask” offer for one
kind or the other at every price along the probability spectrum.
Section II.B derives formulas for the quadratic market scoring
rule, and shows that it is equivalent. Some readers will merely
be interested in the formulas provided in Table 1 below, but I
provide the two derivations to explain how I obtained them and
to emphasize the equivalence of the two approaches.3

A. The Uniform Automated Offers Approach
3

I am grateful to Robin Hanson for pointing out, when I
described the uniform liquidity automated market maker, that
there must be some version of the market scoring rule to
which it would be equivalent.

Suppose that we are making prediction of an event
that will produce a number pfinal, which may range from pmin to
pmax. (In the event of a binary prediction, pfinal = 0 if the event
does not occur and pfinal = 1 if it does, so pmin = 0 and pmax = 1.)
Let the current prediction be equal to pcurrent (initially set to
some default value pdefault), and at all times, let pcurrent* = (pcurrent
– pmin) / (pmax – pmin), and let pfinal* = (pfinal – pmin) / (pmax – pmin).
The market maker is available at any time to sell at every price
an infinitesimal number of shares whose maximum possible
value is v. For prices above pcurrent*, the market maker will sell
an infinitesimal share for v*pcurrent* that will pay off v*pfinal*, and
for prices below pcurrent, the market maker will sell an
infinitesimal share for v*(1 – pcurrent*) that will pay off v*(1 –
pfinal*).
Let d equal the total number of shares that a user
would need to purchase to move the price from pmin to pmax.
Now suppose that a participant wishes to change the price from
pcurrent to pnew, where pnew > pcurrent. We let pnew* = (pnew – pmin) /
(pmax – pmin). Because the automated market maker’s ask offers
are uniformly distributed, the average price of a share in
changing the prediction will be v*(pcurrent* + pnew*)/2. The
number of shares purchased q = d*(pnew* – pcurrent*). So, the total
cost c = (v*(pcurrent* + pnew*)/2)*d*(pnew* – pcurrent*) = (pnew*^2 –
pcurrent*^2)*dv/2.
We can now calculate the maximum subsidy s, which
equals the maximum gain for traders if the market were to start
at a default value of pmin, and trading closed at pmax = pfinal, or
vice versa. If pcurrent* = 0 and pnew* = pfinal* = 1, then c = dv/2,
with a payoff w (for “winnings”) of dv, and thus the subsidy s =
dv – dv/2 = dv/2.
We continue to assume that a participant wishes to
change the price from pcurrent to pnew, where pnew > pcurrent.
Substituting into the equations above, c = s(pnew*^2 – pcurrent*^2),
and the ultimate payout w equals 2s*pfinal** (pnew* – pcurrent*).
Profit π = w – c = s*(2* pfinal** (pnew* – pcurrent*) – (pnew*^2 –
pcurrent*^2)). It can similarly be shown that if a participant wishes
to change the price from pcurrent to pnew, where pnew < pcurrent, c =
s((1 – pcurrent*)^2 – (1 – pnew*)^2), and w = 2s*(1 –
pfinal*)*(pcurrent* – pnew*). Note that these equations do not include
d or v; simply specifying a maximum subsidy s is sufficient to
calculate all variables that are needed to determine costs and
payoffs.
The relevant formulas are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Formulas for Implementing the Uniform Liquidity
Automated Market Maker
Initial state variables
pmin

The
minimum
outcome

possible

Given

pmax

The
maximum
outcome

possible

Given

s

The
maximum
subsidy

possible

Given

v

The maximum possible payoff
of a share

Given

pdefault

The default prediction

Given

pcurrent

The current prediction

At beginning of market:

calculated, as above)

pdefault
After new prediction is
processed: pnew
d

pcurrent*

The density, or the total
number of shares that a
forecaster would need to
purchase to move the
prediction from pmin to pmax

2s/v

The scaled current prediction

(pcurrent – pmin) / (pmax – pmin)

If predictor wishes to purchase “low” shares for a given cost
c

The cost to the predictor (or,
equivalently, the maximum
loss that the predictor faces)

Given by the predictor

pnew*

The scaled new prediction;
must confirm that pmin <= pnew*
<= pmax.

1 – sqrt((1- pcurrent*)^2 + (c
/s))

pnew

The new prediction (from
which other variables can be
calculated, as above)

pmin + pnew* * (pmax – pmin)

Variables realized after occurrence of event
pfinal

pfinal*

The final result of the event (for
a binary event, 0 if the event
does not occur and 1 if it does
occur)

Determined by the ultimate
event, or by the market
sponsor as a result of the
early termination of the
market

The scaled final result

(pfinal – pmin) / (pmax – pmin)

If predictor wishes to set a new prediction higher than the current
prediction
pnew

The new prediction; must
confirm that pmin <= pnew* <=
pmax.

Given by predictor

pnew*

The scaled new prediction

(pnew – pmin) / (pmax – pmin)

c

The cost to the predictor (or,
equivalently, the maximum
loss that the predictor faces)

s(pnew*^2 – pcurrent*^2)

q

The number of “high” shares
received by the predictor

(2s/v) * (pnew* – pcurrent*)

w

The predictor’s gross winnings,
i.e. the payoff that the predictor
receives after occurrence of
the event

2s*pfinal** (pnew* – pcurrent*).

π

The predictor’s net winnings or
profit

w–c

If predictor wishes to set a new prediction lower than the current
prediction
pnew

The new prediction; must
confirm that pmin <= pnew* <=
pmax.

Given by predictor

pnew*

The scaled new prediction

(pnew – pmin) / (pmax – pmin)

c

The cost to the predictor (or,
equivalently, the maximum
loss that the predictor faces)

s((1 – pnew*) ^2 – (1 –
pcurrent*)^2)

q

The number of “low” shares
received by the predictor

(2s/v) * (pcurrent* – pnew*)

w

The predictor’s gross winnings,
i.e. the payoff that the predictor
receives after occurrence of
the event

2s*(1 – pfinal*)*(pcurrent* –
pnew*).

π

The predictor’s net winnings or
profit

w–c

If predictor wishes to purchase “high” shares for a given cost
c

The cost to the predictor (or,
equivalently, the maximum
loss that the predictor faces)

Given by predictor

pnew*

The scaled new prediction;
must confirm that pmin <= pnew*
<= pmax.

sqrt(pcurrent*^2 + (c /s))

pnew

The new prediction (from
which other variables can be

pmin + pnew* * (pmax – pmin)

If predictor wishes to purchase a particular number of “high” shares
q

The number of “high” shares
purchased by the predictor

Given by predictor

pnew*

The scaled new prediction;
must confirm that pmin <= pnew*
<= pmax.

pcurrent* + q/d

pnew

The new prediction (from
which other variables can be
calculated, as above)

pmin + pnew* * (pmax – pmin)

If predictor wishes to purchase a particular number of “low” shares
q

The number of “low” shares
purchased by the predictor

Given by the predictor

pnew*

The scaled new prediction;
must confirm that pmin <= pnew*
<= pmax.

pcurrent* – q/d

pnew

The new prediction (from
which other variables can be
calculated, as above)

pmin + pnew* * (pmax – pmin)

B. The Quadratic Market Scoring Rule Approach
It is straightforward to derive the same formulas using
a quadratic market scoring rule. The quadratic scoring rule is
defined as follows (Murphy and Winkler 1970): Assume that the
forecaster announces a probability distribution p=(p1,…,pn), i.e.
announces pi, 1 <= i <= n, for each of n events, where Σpi = 1. If
the event that occurs is j, the forecaster’s payoff Qj(p) = a + 2b *
pj – b * Σ(pi)2.
Let n = 2 and let p1 correspond to the probability that
the event occurs. Then, if the event does occur, the forecaster
receives payout Q1(p) = a + 2b * p1 – b*(4 p1 – 2 p1^2 – 1), and
if the event does not occur, the payout is Q2(p) = a + b(1 –
2p1^2). Note that a and b represent arbitrary constants.
Assume as before that the prior forecaster has
announced p1 = pcurrent*, and the new forecaster has announced
p1 = pnew*, where pnew* > pcurrent*. The cost for the new forecaster
is the maximum possible loss, which is the loss in the event that
the event does not occur. Thus, c = Q2(pcurrent*) – Q2(pnew*) =
2b(pnew*^2 – pcurrent*^2). Similarly, the profit for the new
forecaster is the gain if the event does occur, where pnew* >
pcurrent*. It follow that π = Q1(pnew*) – Q1(pcurrent*) = 2b*(2(pnew* –
pcurrent*) – (pnew*^2 – pcurrent*^2)).
It is apparent that this is a special case of the formulas
above, where pfinal* = 1 and s = 2b. It is straightforward to show
a similar equivalence where pnew* < pcurrent*.

III. EXTENSIONS
This part explains how to extend the uniform liquidity
market maker. Section III.A explains how the subsidy can be
varied over the probability or prediction spectrum, as well as
over time. Section III.B, meanwhile, explains how the uniform
liquidity market maker can be used when making probabilistic
predictions and there are more than two mutually exclusive
outcomes. Section III.C explains how the market maker can be
run over multiple rounds to create a “deliberative market,” and
Section III.D shows how the deliberative market design makes it
straightforward to implement conditional markets.

A. Variable Subsidy
As noted above, the uniform liquidity automated
market maker provides an equal incentive for a marginal
prediction improvement anywhere along the probability or
prediction spectrum. For many applications, this will be what is
desired, but there may be some situations when it is not.
Suppose, for example, that a software company is deciding
whether to create a new version of its software program, and
that decision will depend in part on the sales of the current
version of the software program. If the expected sales of the
current version are below some low threshold, it definitely will
not be worth creating a new version, and if the expected sales
are above some high threshold, it definitely will be worth
creating a new version. If the company is creating a prediction
market to forecast sales of the current version, and needs the
result only because it will help determine whether to make a
new version of the software, it might not make much sense to
provide a large subsidy below the low threshold or above the
high threshold. Once it is clear that the actual number will not
be between the thresholds, the precise value does not much
matter.
Meanwhile, it also often does not make sense to
provide the same subsidy over time. In particular, it will often
be sensible to provide a lower subsidy at the very beginning of
the market, and to raise this subsidy to the maximum level
afterward. The reason for this is that there may be a number of
predictors who can provide a rough approximation of a
prediction very cheaply, and so a small subsidy will be enough
to induce some predictor to make this approximation if it is
thought that otherwise some other predictor will do so. The
market sponsor, however, ultimately may want greater accuracy
eventually, and so the subsidy can rise, inducing greater levels
of research by predictors. (Of course, a predictor might do
research in advance but then wait to trade on it until the subsidy
is sufficiently high.) In many contexts, the subsidy can be set to
reach its maximum level quite quickly.
One virtue of the dynamic pari-mutuel market is that
the profit from betting will generally rise over time in this way.
The greater the number of bets that have been placed in the
dynamic pari-mutuel market, the greater the liquidity. But if a
dynamic pari-mutuel market is subsidized by the placement of
“seed wagers” at the beginning of the market, much of the
subsidy will effectively be distributed at the start of the market.
At the least, it is not easy to figure out how the dynamic parimutuel market can be modified so that a given level of subsidy

can be provided at a particular time, let alone for different
portions of the probability spectrum.
Table 2 shows how to implement a general automated
market maker on top of the uniform automated market maker. It
introduces various new variables representing the relative
subsidy to be given over the probability spectrum and over time.
In contrast to Table 1, the maximum possible subsidy is now
represented by the variable σ, and the variable s now represents
an adjusted subsidy variable. Once calculated, this s variable
can be used wherever s appears in Table 1 to calculate various
other variables based on a new prediction specified by the
predictor. Unfortunately, there is no simple formula for
determining the new prediction based on a cost or number of
shares input by a predictor. If this is desired, however, it can be
straightforwardly calculated by creating a two-dimensional
array of possible new predictions and the corresponding costs.

Table 2. Formulas for a General Automated Market Maker
New variables and the calculation of the adjusted subsidy measure
f(p)

The subsidy weight for a
marginal change to a given
prediction p

Given for all p between
pmin and pmax, where 0 <=
f(p) for all p.

F(p)

The
cumulative
function for f(p)

Can be calculated from
f(p). Note that F(pmin) = 0,
and where pmin + ε <= p <=
pmax, F(p) ≈ F(p-ε) + εf(p).

fmean(a,b)

The average value of f(p) from
a to b

(F(b) – F(a))/(b-a)

g(t)

The subsidy weight at time t,
where 0 <= g(t) <= 1 for all t.

Given

t

The time at which the current
transaction takes place

Given

σ

The
maximum
subsidy

Given

s

Adjusted subsidy variable

density

possible

σ * g(t) * fmean (pcurrent, pnew)
/ fmean(pmin, pmax)

There may be some circumstances in which it makes
sense to change the relative subsidy levels based on variables
such as the current price or the current time. Consider, for
example, a prediction market being used to predict the outcome
of a sports contest. The sponsor of the market might want new
predictions to be announced during the event, but might not
want to offer larger subsidies closer to the current prediction
level. Otherwise, there will be a particularly large award for
whichever predictor happens to respond to a major event in the
contest by entering a new prediction the fastest. This
modification should be straightforward to implement by
changing the subsidy distribution f(p) over time. Note that the
distribution should be centered around the price with a short
time lag, lest users be able to capture the full subsidy by rapidly
entering numerous incremental predictions. This approach limits
the ability of any market participant to receive a large subsidy
simply for acting first on news available to all participants.

B. More Than Two Mutually Exclusive Events
The above analysis makes it straightforward to
forecast either a continuous variable or a binary variable, that is
to predict whether a single event A1 will or will not occur. If
either A1 will occur or A2 will occur, then the approach above
can be used simply to forecast A1, since A2 = 1 – A1.
Equivalently, however, one could run two markets, allowing the
automated market maker to sell “low” and “high” shares in both
A1 and A2. A user could maximize profit from a given correction
to the relevant probabilities by trading on both markets, and
arbitrageurs should generally ensure that the market prices add
up to unity. A simpler strategy, however, is to have any trading
in A1 or A2 automatically result in trading in A1 and A2. So, for
example, when a user requests to make a purchase that will
change the prediction of A1 from 0.30 to 0.31, the system reports
the cost of changing the prediction of A1 from 0.30 to 0.31 (by
buying “high” shares in A1), plus the cost of changing the
prediction of A2 from 0.70 to 0.69 (by buying “low” shares in
A2). The system would, of course, report the exact same price if
the user requests to make a purchase that will change the
prediction of A2 from 0.70 to 0.69. The subsidy for each of these
two markets could be set to half of the original intended
maximum subsidy.
Of course, this modest added complexity has little
value when there are only two mutually exclusive events to be
forecast, but it can be quite valuable when there are three or
more. From a user interface perspective, the user can enter new
probabilities for each (or for all but one) event, or alternatively,
the user can simply change one probability, and the system can
calculate the probabilities to which the user is setting the other
events. A simple approach is by default to change the other
predictions proportionately so that all of the predictions
continue to add up to 1, and to report the price for conducting all
of the transactions simultaneously. (A useful user interface
feature might allow the user to move sliders for any one event,
with the sliders for all other events moving responsively.) So, let
pcurrent*(i) and pnew*(i) represent the current and new predictions
for some event i, 1 <= i <= n, where n is the total number of
mutually exclusive events. Then, for each j, 1 <= j <= n, where i
≠ j, pnew*(j) = pcurrent*(j) + (pcurrent*(i) – pnew*(i)) * pcurrent*(j) / (1 –
pcurrent*(i)).
Two technical details: First, if the maximum total
subsidy is t, then the maximum subsidy σ corresponding to the
market for each mutually exclusive possibility should be set to
t/2. This is true regardless of the number of mutually exclusive
events. Second, there is no simple formula for determining the
new prediction based on a cost or number of shares input by a
predictor. Once again, however, if this is desired, it can be
straightforwardly calculated by creating a two-dimensional
array of possible new predictions and the corresponding costs,
and interpolating between them.

C. Deliberative Markets
Abramowicz (2006) described the operation of a
deliberative prediction market. In such a market, a participant’s
performance depends not just on ultimately being proved right

by the event being predicted, but on actually succeeding in
moving the market along some potentially smaller interval. To
succeed in such a market, a trader must convince other market
participants that one is correct.
This approach is straightforward to implement in
conjunction with the market design described here. The system
must pay off shares held by predictors at some time after the
prediction is made, but potentially before the event occurs. The
exact amount of time is randomized to prevent manipulation.
Suppose that the prediction is made at time t. Then, the system
calculates a reimbursement time of tfinal= tmin – h * ln(rand()) /
ln(2), where tmin is a minimum amount of time, h is the half life
after this minimum is reached, ln() is the natural logarithm
function, and rand() is a pseudo-random number generator
producing a floating point number uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. At time tfinal, the shares for the predictor are
paid off by setting pfinal for that predictor only to pcurrent. Of
course, if the event actually occurs, all remaining shares are paid
off based on pfinal.
Two technical points: First, the subsidy s in Table 1 is
no longer the maximum theoretically possible subsidy. Second,
h should be set to an amount of time long enough so that if
someone did try to manipulate the market, others with high
probability would successfully counter such manipulation. It
may often make sense for h to fall closer to the conclusion of an
event. For example, more traders are likely to be sitting by their
computers looking at market prices during the fourth quarter of
a basketball game being forecast than hours before, and so h
might be as short as, say, a minute.
The deliberative market approach may work
effectively even where producing deliberation is not a goal of
the market. One problem with traditional prediction market
designs is that predictors’ money is unavailable when a market
is running. This is particularly problematic where a market may
not resolve itself for many years. Although there are some
possible solutions—such as investing money in a mutual fund—
making tmin and h relatively short is a simple one.
Note that market participants will still have incentives
to forecast the ultimate event because they will recognize that
predictors just before the event occurs will have such incentives,
and that predictors just before that will have an incentive to
anticipate the predictions of later predictors, and so forth. This
may seem attenuated, but it is in fact no different from many
security markets where the payoff will not occur for a long time.
Even if each individual trader expects to be in the market only a
short period of time, the market fundamentals depend on the
eventual event.

D. Conditional Markets
The most significant disadvantage of the quadratic
market scoring rule, as well as of the variations described here,
is that it is not well suited to combinatorial markets. With a
combinatorial market, a single subsidy can be allocated
automatically to subsidize all possible combinations of events.
But conditional markets can still be used to make discrete
conditional probability forecasts. Suppose, for example, that
prediction markets are used to forecast whether each of 12
battleground states will vote Democratic or Republican in the

next Presidential election. A combinatorial market would
effectively allow trading on all permutations and combinations,
including for example the probability that Florida will go
Democratic if Ohio and New Mexico go Republican, and it
would ensure that the market results are consistent. Conditional
prediction markets, meanwhile, can be used to make any
particular conditional evaluation specified by the market
sponsor, but there is no mechanism for providing automatic
consistency among large number of markets. Such conditional
markets will satisfy the needs of many, though perhaps not all,
potential market sponsors.
One way to implement conditional markets is to
simply run markets on different possibilities. For example, one
might create a market on whether the Republican candidate will
win both the Presidency and Florida, as well as a market on
whether the Republican will win Florida. The probability of the
first divided by the probability of the second provides an
estimate of the probability that the Republican will win the
Presidency contingent on the Republican winning Florida.
Mathematically, this approach is straightforward, and the user
interface could present the user with the derived conditional
prediction.
A predictor could correct misaligned conditional
probabilities by placing bets on both markets. For example,
suppose that a predictor believes that the market is
underestimating the probability that the Republican will win the
Presidency contingent on the Republican winning Florida.
Suppose, though, that the predictor has no idea which of the two
markets is misaligned. Then, the predictor could purchase shares
in the “both” security, and sell short shares in the Florida
security. If done in just the appropriate proportions, the
predictor will end up with no gains or losses if in fact the
Republican does not win in Florida. So, the predictor is truly
making a conditional assessment. A drawback, however, is that
the predictor will have tied up money for potentially the full
duration of the market, and that may be undesirable, especially
if the condition is unlikely.
An alternative way to implement conditional markets
with the quadratic market scoring rule and other automated
market makers is to unwind a market if the condition is not met.
For example, a single prediction market can be maintained that
forecasts whether the Republican will win the Presidency if
Florida votes Republican. If Florida does not vote Republican,
any money charged for shares is refunded, so traders will
assume that Florida in fact will vote Republican for the purposes
of this market. This approach, however, has the same drawback
as before, that individuals will often not want to tie up their
money for long periods of time, especially for unlikely
contingencies.
The deliberative market structure described above,
however, largely overcomes this problem. As soon as it
becomes apparent that the contingency will not be met, the
market unwinds only those predictions that have not yet
produced a payoff. If round times are sufficiently brief, traders
can generally profit on predictions even when the contingency is
not ultimately met. For example, if the minimum round time is a
week and the half life is equal to a few hours, then a conditional
prediction made in October will with very high probability be
resolved by the election.

The other advantage of this approach is consistent
with the benefit of the general market maker discussed in this
paper, that it makes it possible to target subsidies to the
questions of greatest interest. A market sponsor might
sometimes be interested in the probability of A conditional on B,
but not otherwise interested in the probability of B. Creating
markets in A&B and B effectively allocates a portion of the
subsidy to users who can improve the market’s information on
whether B will occur. By using the deliberative market structure
and unwinding only once it becomes clear that a condition will
not occur, the market sponsor is providing financial incentive
only for research on A conditional on B. Of course, the market
sponsor might be interested in subsidizing a market on B as
well, but in that case can determine how great a subsidy to
allocate to provide incentives for research on the probability of
B.

IV. CONCLUSION
No experimentation is required to demonstrate that the
quadratic market scoring rule should give market participants
incentives to move prices toward the values they perceive as
correct. Risk-averse participants might not move prices all the
way to the values that they perceive as correct given all
information (Sonnemans and Offerman 2001), but at least
should move prices in the correct direction. Ideally, however,
experimentation should be done to assess the degree to which
the quadratic market scoring rule may improve on alternatives in
providing greater subsidies for particular parts of the probability
spectrum. It seems quite plausible that in lab experiments, many
automated market makers will perform comparably, in part
because it may take participants a long time to figure out how to
optimize their research and prediction activities. The quadratic
market scoring rule’s effects should be greatest in markets with
very large subsidies, where participants will have sufficient
incentives to tend to these details, but to date prediction market
subsidies have been relatively small.
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